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Abstract
Recent experimental research suggests that unpredicted behavior in the lab may 
result from endowment distribution and origin. We design an experiment to 
explore the impact of heterogeneous endowments and earned endowments on 
observed contributions in a linear public good game. Our results suggest that 
contribution levels were significantly lower when groups had heterogeneous 
rather than homogeneous endowments, with this finding being independent of 
the origin of endowment. We did not find, however, that the lack of free-riding in 
public goods experiments was an artifact of endowment origin. Group members 
contributed about the same to the public good whether their endowments were 
earned or not.
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1. Introduction
Rational choice theory says people free ride in the voluntary provision of a public good.
The dominant strategy is for each person to make zero contributions in a linear public good
game, but evidence from the lab suggests otherwise. Most people do not free ride; they make
positive though suboptimal contributions to the public good (e.g.,Ledyard, 1995,Ostrom,
2000). Some researchers have attempted to capture this behavior by extending theory to
include notions of fairness and reciprocity (e.g,Rabin, 1993; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
andFehr and G̈achter, 2000a,b); while in related game-theoretic settings, others contend
that such behavior may arise from faint concerns of self-interest (e.g.,Baik et al., 1999;
Hoffman et al., 1994; Forsythe et al., 1994).
The ambiguity has led some researchers to ask if either the homogeneity or origin of
endowments or both within public good games could affect how people adhere to the pre-
dictions of rational choice theory. While researchers recognize that homogeneity of wealth
is an obvious abstraction from reality employed to gain tractability, experimental investiga-
tions into how people make contributions within heterogeneous groups is relatively sparse.
In his review of public good experiments, Ledyard (pp. 158–160) lists five experimental
papers and tepidly concludes that heterogeneity, at least when information is complete,
tends to decrease contributions. Also, evidence suggests that people with high incomes
contribute less than what theory predicts for non-linear public good games while those with
low incomes contribute more (also seeChan et al., 1996). In contrast, althoughC an et al.
(1999)observe mixed behavior in comparing heterogeneous versus homogenous wealth,
they conclude heterogeneity has a positive effect on aggregate contributions. But interaction
effects exist between communication and information in their experiment that confound the
strength of their conclusion.
Regarding endowment origin, economists and psychologists have long argued that the
origin of wealth influences individual behavior.Friedman’s (1957)permanent income hy-
pothesis, for instance, is an early conjecture that behavior varies over wealth from different
sources, but the evidence from the lab is mixed. Some researchers find evidence that the
origin of assets does not influence subject behavior in laboratory settings (e.g.,Clark, 1998,
2002; Rutstr̈om and Williams, 2000; Ball et al., 2001). In contrast, other work provides
evidence that asset origin does alter a person’s marginal propensity to consume and take
risks, with windfall (i.e., unearned) endowments leading to more generous and risky be-
havior (Keeler et al., 1985; Arkes et al., 1995; Thaler and Johnson, 1990; andKeasey and
Moon, 1996). People act more munificently and take more chances when spending “other
people’s money.”
The dictator game exemplifies the context in which asset origin affects behavior (see
Hoffman et al., 1996; Ruffle, 1998; Konow, 2000). Recall the dictator game is a one-
stage, two-player bargain in which rational choice theory predicts the dictator makes zero
contributions to others, as in the linear public good game.Cherry et al. (2002), for instance,
uncover the strongest impact of asset origin when anonymous dictators must earn their
endowment prior to the bargain. They report the rate of positive offers falls to 5 percent
from the typical 40–50 percent when anonymous dictatorsearn their endowments. They
conclude the linear public goods game is another context in which subjects deviate from the
predicted zero contribution outcome, and they speculate whether “windfall wealth might
explain the lack of free riding in the provision of public goods in the laboratory.” This
implies that people might act less generous to other contributors when asked to donate
earned money to the public good.
Herein, we explore the impact of endowment heterogeneity and origin in public good
experiments. This paper rejects the thesis that the positive contribution behavior observed in
linear public goods games is an artifact of asset origin. Our experimental evidence suggests
that the origin of endowments did not matter—subjects contributed about the same level
regardless of whether their wealth was earned or windfall. We do find that contributions fall
significantly, however, once wealth was heterogeneous within a group of contributors. The
average person within a heterogeneous group contributes less relative to one in a homoge-
nous group, but contributions were still independent of the source of wealth. Subjects with
high endowments contributed significantly less when they were in heterogeneous groups, an
observation suggestive of an anticipated reciprocity effect that does not exist in the dictator
game.
2. Experimental design
Our design uses a classic linear public good game, in which earned and windfall en-
dowments are the treatments (T1 and T2). The experiment had two stages –earningsand
public good contributions– each with a written protocol.1 Consider first the earnings stage.
In treatment T1 we followCherry et al. (2002). Each subject earned money by taking a
quiz containing 17 questions taken from the sample section of the Graduate Management
Admission Test (GMAT).2 The amount earned was determined by the following rule: if
a subject answered at least 14 questions correctly, he or she would earn $40; between 11
and 13 questions, $30; between 8 and 10, $20; and fewer than 8, $10. Subjects knew they
had 45 min to complete the quiz and that the monitors would collect and grade the quizzes
and inform them of their cash earnings in confidence. In treatment T2, the endowment
was a windfall. Here a monitor randomly allocated the four endowment levels by the order
subjects entered the room.
Second, the public good contribution game was identical in T1 and T2. Four subjects are
grouped into a collective without knowing the identities of the other group members. Each
subject in a group receives ane dowment sheetshowing (a) his or her own endowment
according to the earnings rule, and (b) the endowments of the other three group members.
The groups were either homogeneous (e.g., all four had a $30 endowment) or heterogeneous
(one subject from each endowment level, $10–$40). Each person in a group then decides
individually how to divide his monetary endowment between a private account and a public
1 The monitor read the instructions aloud and administered a control questionnaire to make sure the subjects
understood the instructions. The full instructions, as is the raw data, are available on this journal’s website.
2 The use of a quiz follows previous work (e.g.,Hoffman et al., 1996; Clark, 1998; List and Cherry, 2000), though
other studies have employed various measures of effort: preparing letters (Konow, 2000), solving a computerized
puzzle (Rutstr̈om and Williams, 2000), finding a way through a computerized maze (Gn ezy, 2003) and cracking
walnuts (Fahr and Irlenbusch, 2000). These papers, however, do not compare outcomes in treatments with real
effort to those without effort.
account. All money placed in one’s private account is private earnings; money placed in
the public account is multiplied by 2 and divided equally among the group members,
independent of whether a member had contributed to the public account. While the social
optimum is for each subject to contribute his entire endowment to the public account, the
Nash equilibrium is for each person to put his entire endowment into his private account.
The public good game was played only once to remove any beliefs that generosity in one
period could trigger reciprocal behavior by other group members in a future period. After
the experiment was completed, subjects exited the lab and returned one hour later to collect
their earnings.
One hundred and twenty-four students from St. Lawrence University participated in four
sessions.3 No subject was an economics major or had previously participated in a public
goods experiment. Depending on the treatment, the sessions lasted either 40 or 90 min
including reading the instructions. The average compensation for each subject was $34.78,
with a range of $9–$82.50.
3. Results
We first review subject behavior at the aggregate level to examine the impact of endow-
ment heterogeneity and origin on public good contributions.Table 1provides subject con-
tribution rates by treatment and endowment level. First examining endowment distribution,
tests of proportions reveal that subjects acting in groups with heterogeneous endowments
contribute less to the public good relative to those in groups with homogeneous endow-
ments, 10.50 versus 7.16 (t= 1.977). While still apparent, the result is weakened by testing
the contribution as a percentage of endowment, 42.1 percent versus 33.1 percent (t= 1.47).
This result emerges whether the endowment was allocated or earned, 10.22 versus 6.56
when endowments were allocated and 10.82 versus 7.75 when endowments were earned.
Turning to the impact of endowment origin, the data indicate that contribution levels
do not significantly differ for subjects who earned their endowment relative to those with
windfall endowments; 8.39 versus 9.18 comparing absolute contributions (t = 0.46) and
38.3 percent versus 36.6 percent comparing relative contributions (t = −0.28). This result
emerges whether subjects are acting within groups with homogeneous or heterogeneous en-
dowments, 10.22 versus 10.82 in homogenous groups and 6.56 versus 7.75 in heterogeneous
groups.4
Now consider a conditional analysis of individual decisions to confirm our interpretation
of the aggregate numbers.Table 2shows the results from the following empirical model of
3 We recruited more than 124 subjects and sent some home in the earned endowment treatment after they took
the quiz. We did this to ensure we had an equally divided subject pool across the four endowment categories.
Those subjects sent home were randomly chosen from the different endowment categories in each treatment and
received the money they would have had as endowment had they stayed in the experiment.
4 Interestingly, only considering heterogeneous treatments at the aggregate level suggests a possible interaction
between earning and endowment effects. Conditional estimates however do not reveal a significant interaction. We
thank an anonymous referee for raising this issue. The raw data, as the instructions, are provided on the journal’s
website.
Table 1
Average absolute and relative contribution to the public good by endowment attributes
Endowment
level
Allocated Earned Earned and allocated
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous and
heterogeneous
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous and
heterogeneous
Homogeneous Heterogeneous Homogeneous and
heterogeneous
10 5.00 (50.00) 6.50 (65.00) 5.75 (57.50) 4.25 (42.50) 4.25 (42.50) 4.25 (42.50) 4.75 (47.50) 5.38 (53.75) 5.10 (51.07)
20 9.38 (46.88) 5.75 (28.75) 7.56 (37.81) 9.50 (47.50) 4.13 (20.63) 6.81 (34.06) 9.44 (47.19) 4.94 (24.69) 7.19 (35.94)
30 11.25 (37.50) 6.50 (21.67) 8. 8 (29.58) 11.00 (36.67) 13.25 (44.17) 12.13 (40.42) 11.13 (37.08) 9.88 (32.92) 10.50 (35.00)
40 15.25 (38.13) 7.50 (18.75) 11.38 (28.44) 15.25 (38.13) 9.38 (23.44) 12.31 (30.78) 15.25 (38.13) 8.44 (21.09) 11.84 (29.61)
All levels 10.22 (43.13) 6.56 (33.54) 8.39 (38.33) 10.82 (41.01) 7.75 (32.68) 9.18 (36.57) 10.50 (42.14) 7.16 (33.11) 8.77 (37.48)
Top number represents the absolute contribution in $ terms while the number in parentheses is the relative contribution (percent of endowment).
Table 2
Absolute and relative contribution models
Contribution
Absolutea Relativeb
Earned 0.670 (0.682) −0.784 (0.897)
Homogeneous 3.139 (0.057) 9.658 (0.114)
Endowment 0.227 (0.003) −0.658 (0.019)
Constant 1.139 (0.620) 49.945 (0.000)
N 124 124
F 4.64 (0.004) 2.66 (0.062)
a Dependent variable is the absolute dollar amount contributed.
b Dependent variable is the percentage of endowment contributedp-values are in parentheses.
contribution levels:
Ci = α+ φi + ωi + ψi + εi,
where the dependent variable,Ci denotes theith subject’s contribution to the public good,
φi captures whether the endowment for subjecti was earned or allocated,ωi captures
whether the members of subjecti’s group had homogeneous or heterogeneous endowments,
ψi measures the absolute endowment level of subjecti, α is the constant term andεi is
the contemporaneous additive error term. We estimate two contribution models—absolute
dollar contributions andrelativecontributions as the percentage of a subject’s endowment.
The conditional estimates match our initial impressions. In both the absolute and rel-
ative contribution models, no significant difference exists in behavior between subjects
who earned their endowments and those who received a windfall. The earnings result is
robust with estimates being conditioned on wealth levels and whether the subject was in a
homogeneous or heterogeneous group.
We do find, however, that when earnings were heterogeneous within a group, our subjects
contributed significantly less to the public good than those in groups with homogeneous
endowments. The level of wealth has a significant positive relationship with contributions in
absolute dollars and a significant inverse relationship in real terms (% of wealth). These two
findings correspond with Ledyard’s restrained conclusion that heterogeneous endowments
might decrease contribution levels andChan et al.’s (1996, 1999)observation that people
with high incomes under-contribute and those with low incomes over-contribute relative
to the rational benchmark in a non-linear public goods experiment. Although our earnings
protocol replicated the Cherry et al. design, the results differ, suggesting that the influence
of asset origin could be context dependent.5 Relative to anonymous dictators, subjects
acting in the public goods game faced a more complex task that demanded greater cognitive
effort and involved simultaneous decisions by other contributors. Our finding that high
income subjects contributed less in heterogeneous than homogeneous groups suggests an
5 This result is consistent withClark (2002), who found that subjects did not behave differently in a public good
game when they provided their own endowment.Bosman and van Winden (2002)observed in a power-to-take
game that take rates by the first movers were not significantly different in the treatments with and without real
efforts, but second movers destroyed less often their own and the first movers’ incomes in the real-effort treatment.
“anticipated reciprocity” effect: subjects contributed more when others were also able to
contribute more. Rather than being viewed as being generous with their earned wealth,
subjects seemed to expect a reciprocation of their contributions. This notion of anticipated
reciprocity is consistent with the “conditional cooperators” idea discussed inFischbacher
et al. (2001). They find that 50 percent of all subjects were willing to contribute more to the
public good when they believed (i.e., anticipated) that the others players would contribute
more as well (i.e., reciprocate). The difference to our experiment, however, is that in their
study everybody had the chance to contribute on all levels, which is not the case in ours.
That is, a conditional cooperator is willing to contributehigh if everybody else does andlow
if everybody else does—she does little when she knows the others will not reciprocate even
though they could. In our experiment, a subject with high endowment in a heterogeneous
group will do little since she knows the others with small endowments will not reciprocate
because they cannot.
4. Concluding remark
People in the lab voluntarily contribute more to the public good than theory predicts.
Based on previous lab work, two explanations have been suggested to explain this discrep-
ancy: the origin and the distribution of wealth. Windfall wealth can lead to more generosity
and risk taking (e.g.,Cherry, 2001), whereas ex ante heterogeneous groups or people con-
fronting ex post heterogeneous payoffs are more likely to act more self-interested (e.g.,
Sutter and Weck-Hannemann, 2003; Shogren, 1997). We test whether either heterogeneity
of wealth or the origin of wealth (or both) affect contributions in a public good game. We
find the origin of wealth did not matter to contribution levels in a linear public goods game.
People contributed the same irrespective of whether wealth was windfall or earned. But
we do see that contributions fell when earnings were heterogeneous within a group. This
heterogeneity result is consistent with an “anticipated reciprocity” effect, in which people
act as if they expect others to contribute too, which may dominate any influence from the
origin of wealth.
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